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The EU’s budget is a lens through which the European 
integration process can be observed. Having a sound 
budget is a major precondition for this integration 
process to proceed and succeed. However, with 
national contributions accounting for about 85 percent 
of the EU budget, and the ongoing net payer debate, 
the financing of the EU budget is mainly influenced by 
accounting calculations (Mathis 2015). These do not 
reflect the real benefits and added value of the EU 
budget and can be considered as thwarting the initial 
rationale of giving the EU ‘the means necessary to 
attain its objectives and carry through its policies’ 
(Article 311 TFEU). It is therefore widely agreed that 
the current system of financing the EU budget is no 
longer viable. Additionally, the uncertainties linked to 
the upcoming Brexit negotiations are equally bound to 
have a major impact on the EU budget. With the UK 
leaving, the EU budget could be reduced by up to ten 
billion euro a year (Ducourtieux 2017). 
A reformed budget would reflect the general level of 
ambition, unity and credibility the political leaders want 
to bestow on the EU. It would be a signal of a strong 
willingness to equip the Union with real means for 
economic growth, an affirmation of political power, and 
a way of asserting a complete balance between its two 
legislative branches (Hagemann 2014). What is true for 
the way the money is spent also applies to the way EU 
resources are identified. This is reason enough to seek 
new and alternative ways of financing the EU budget. 
As a contribution to the broader debate about the EU’s 
next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and the 
structure of its budget, further fuelled by the recent 
publication of the European Commission’s Reflection 
Paper on the Future of EU Finances (2017a), this policy 
brief builds upon and assesses the Monti Report. The 
report, published in December 2016, contains guiding 
principles (fiscal sovereignty and neutrality, general 
volume, progressivity of the implementation) and 
guidelines that are clearly oriented towards finding 
resources directly linked to EU policies, ‘European 
public goods’, and towards making the link – for the first 
time – between revenue and spending. It also proposes 
to move towards a more transparent, simple and 
equitable system of own resources, granting the EU 
more autonomy from the member states. Indeed, as 
Executive Summary 
> The current system of European Union (EU) 
own resources is running out of steam and 
contributes to exacerbating the tensions 
between EU member states, especially net 
contributors and net beneficiaries.  
> The prospect of a Brexit should be considered 
as an opportunity to reform the system in 
order to simplify it, make it more transparent 
and more democratic.  
> As long as member states keep focusing on 
accounting calculations, the EU budget cannot 
be an efficient investment tool, enabling the 
EU to deliver the full potential of its policies. 
> The Monti Report, while not seeking to 
increase the overall volume of EU spending, 
aims at finding novel ways of financing the EU 
budget, to make it less dependent on member 
states’ contributions. 
> In a general context of budgetary restrictions, 
it seems most unlikely that member states will 
agree on radically changing the EU’s own 
resources, however – unless a strong political 
will to deepen EU integration develops among 
the EU-27. 
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long as member states keep focusing on the flows of 
money and their juste retour, the EU budget cannot 
become an efficient investment tool, enabling it to 
respond to the current challenges and to deliver the full 
potential of its policies. As such, the budgetary problem 
is real, and the Monti Report, while not seeking to 
increase the overall volume of EU spending, aims at 
finding new ways of financing the EU budget in order to 
make it less dependent on member states’ 
contributions.  
This report is however not the panacea. The main 
challenge lies in the national veto positions, and ways 
to overcome those. It is most unlikely that member 
states, in a general context of national budgetary 
restrictions, will agree on radically changing the EU’s 
own resources system. The subjacent problem of the 
budget debate could be viewed as the opposition 
between a long-term rational approach (the need to 
change the way the EU budget is financed following the 
Treaty rationale and giving more leeway to the EU to 
finance its policies) and a short-term political reality (in 
a context of national electoral deadlines and austerity). 
It might therefore be difficult to convince member 
states to give up their grip on the EU budget, and 
cutbacks are more likely to be made to the spending. 
Before presenting a preliminary assessment of the 
Monti Report, the policy brief outlines the state of play 
of the EU’s resources.  
EU own resources 
State of play 
Despite major evolutions over the years, the Treaties 
have always promoted EU financial autonomy through 
the principle that ‘the budget shall be financed wholly 
from own resources’ (Article 311 TFEU). After an initial 
period of financing by means of direct national 
contributions, ‘traditional own resources’ (mainly 
customs duties and agricultural levies) were introduced 
in 1970. In the late 1970s, those were complemented 
with a Value-Added Tax (VAT) resource, which gradually 
became the main source of funding until the late 1990s. 
Over time, its proportion has however declined, and is 
now at approximately 15 percent of the total EU 
revenue. With the gradual development of new policies 
and rising expenditures, a new resource based on 
member state contributions was eventually established 
in 1988. Over time, this Gross National Income(GNI)-
based resource has been growing to become the 
predominant part of the EU revenue (d’Oultremont and 
Mijs 2013). At the same time, an increased use of 
correction mechanisms has been developing, in which 
member states tend to focus primarily on their own net 
financial benefits.  
A reform is arguably needed to allow the EU budget to 
be financed almost fully by ‘genuine own resources’, 
closely linked to expenditure, enabling a maximum 
leverage effect and freeing the EU budget from the 
omnipresent accounting calculations. However, one 
could also argue that, despite the numerous correction 
mechanisms and the fact that it is mainly based on GNI-
based resources, the current system works rather well 
and is to the liking of most member states 
(d’Oultremont and Mijs 2013). Furthermore, aiming for 
a reform would mean opening a real debate on the EU 
budget (amongst other on the financing of the EU 
institutions), which could ultimately lead to a debate on 
European integration itself (Cipriani 2014). In the actual 
climate of rising populism, the appropriateness of 
launching a debate on the EU budget could therefore be 
questioned as well.  
Reforming the EU’s own resources 
The process of reviewing and reforming the financing of 
the EU budget is not new (Fuest 2015). Already in March 
2007, French MEP Lamassoure urged for a two-stage 
approach in order to reform the financing of the EU 
budget: first abolish all corrections and rebates, and 
subsequently implement a new system of own 
resources (Lamassoure 2007).  
In a 2011 resolution on the Multiannual Financial 
Framework, the European Parliament argued anew for 
an ‘ending of existing rebates and correction 
mechanisms’ and for the ‘introduction of new genuine 
own resources as a way to contribute to financial 
stability and economic recovery’ (European Parliament 
2011). During the negotiations on the 2014-2020 MFF, 
the Parliament managed to secure the creation of a 
High Level Working Group on Own Resources (HLGOR) 
under the leadership of former Italian Prime Minister 
Monti and composed of Members designated by the 
European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the 
European Commission. Its mission was to conduct a 
general examination of the EU’s existing  own resources 
system and to consult national parliaments through an 
interinstitutional conference, to find more transparent, 
simple, fair and democratically accountable ways to 
finance the Union.  
The final Monti Report, presented in the European 
Parliament and the Council in January 2017, advocates 
for a substantial reform of the EU budget, requiring 
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changes both on the expenditure and revenue sides. 
The report presents nine recommendations, which can 
be summarised according to three rationales: 1) having 
‘genuine’ own resources strictly linked to the EU’s 
activities and competences, contributing to EU 
objectives; 2) focusing on the provision of public goods; 
3) not increasing the volume of the EU budget via new 
resources, but using these latter to decrease national 
contributions while keeping the fiscal burden on 
citizens stable. 
The Monti Report: a possible way forward? 
The general acknowledgments of the Monti Report, and 
the needs it underlines, remain to a large extent similar 
to the insights of the 2007 Lamassoure Report. Based 
on the observation that a major proportion of the EU’s 
resources cannot be considered as genuine own 
resources, but merely contributions coming directly 
from the national budgets (by means of GNI-based 
contributions) and from a VAT-based income (which 
cannot be considered as genuinely EU-owned), the 
shortcomings of the current system of financing of the 
EU budget are undeniable.  
Despite the fact that the Monti Report gives a general 
impression of being more consensual, factual and at the 
crossroads of the points of view of the different 
institutions, it adopts an overall severe stance on the 
current role of the EU member states and their general 
attitude towards the EU budget. 
The key recommendations of the Monti Report 
The Monti Report aims first and foremost at sharing one 
general idea, rather than making concrete proposals. In 
order to evolve towards a more transparent, simple and 
democratic budget, it emphasises an overall change of 
paradigm. If one was to single out one key element from 
this report, it would be the overarching 
recommendation to strive for more ‘European added 
value’. To a much larger extent, both for the revenue as 
for the spending sides of the EU budget, member states 
should reflect on the purpose of the European budget, 
therefore aiming at more investment and an increased 
leverage. In order to assess this ‘European added value’, 
the report proposes possible ways forward.  
Although it was not actually part of its mandate, the 
Monti Report attaches great importance to the link 
between expenditures and revenues. It pays 
considerable attention to the intrinsic political value of 
each potential resource proposed. This logic is seen as a 
way to formulate European policies, but also to increase 
the proximity between the EU budget and its citizens. 
Indeed, the Monti Report repeatedly emphasises the 
lack of direct link between the EU budget and its real 
contributors. By proposing to use more resources 
directly related to European policies – for instance the 
common market or environmental policies – a clear link 
would be established between revenues and spending, 
going beyond a mere redistribution of money. Efforts 
could and should therefore to a greater extent be 
concentrated on areas where the EU can really make a 
difference, such as the provision of EU-wide public 
goods. From a national perspective, however, lending 
political support to spending on EU wide-public goods is 
less attractive and more difficult to translate into net 
financial benefits that a member state government can 
sell to its population. 
The Monti Report also contemplates making use of 
differentiation in terms of public policies (for instance 
enhanced cooperation, the Eurozone), which would be 
accompanied by budgetary differentiation. This would 
mean having a ‘variable geometry’ Europe, involving a 
‘variable geometry’ budget. This approach may seem 
inevitable in the longer term, especially in light of the 
options presented in the White Paper on the Future of 
Europe (European Commission 2017b), but will have to 
take into due consideration the power balances within 
the Union, if it is to avoid adding a new layer of 
complexity to the EU’s budget. The search for 
simplification being one of the central elements of the 
HLGOR’s recommendations, it will be essential to adjust 
the financial aspects of the budget to the functions the 
budget will have to fulfil. As an illustration, the choice 
of the financing of the Eurozone will be crucial, not only 
because it will lead to differentiation, but also because 
it will have an impact on the Union’s overall 
governance. 
Linked to the need for simplification, the current 
fragmentation of the EU budget is another recurring 
theme of the Monti Report, as it is seen as presenting 
several threats, not the least in terms of democratic 
accountability. In this context, the correction 
mechanisms and rebates are subject to many critiques, 
mainly due to the complexity and the lack of 
transparency they generate. Admittedly, these 
mechanisms are the result of political negotiations, but 
they do not contribute to the general legibility of the EU 
budget and they disrespect the deeper attention policy-
makers should pay to the aforementioned ‘European 
added value’. Brexit is therefore considered as the 
ultimate opportunity to rethink the whole correction 
and rebate structure. Asserting the ‘European added 
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value’ as a central value of the EU budget would ideally 
make correction and rebate mechanisms obsolete.  
A final option for a reform of the EU’s own resources is 
to give more leeway to the European Parliament, and 
increase its budgetary powers on the revenue side. 
More precisely, by reducing the amounts of financial 
means coming directly from the member states a 
greater margin of manoeuvre could be offered to the 
EU as a whole and to the European Parliament in 
particular. Member states would no longer be able – at 
least not to the same extent as is currently the case –, 
to claim the same scrutiny rights on the allocation of 
European spending. Both EU legislators could therefore 
be given a more complementary share in allocating the 
EU budget. Such a measure would potentially help 
reducing the focus on the juste retour and enable a 
budget that is more globally directed towards 
furthering shared European interests rather than 
narrow national demands.  
Assessing the Monti Report 
The Monti Report evaluates all the existing and 
potential new resources that were studied, including a 
CO2 levy/carbon pricing, the inclusion of the EU 
emission trading system proceeds, a motor fuel levy, an 
electricity tax-based own resource, a common 
consolidated corporate tax base, an EU corporate 
income tax, a financial transaction tax, a bank levy, a 
reformed EU VAT and seigniorage, in light of eight 
criteria: equity/fairness; efficiency; sufficiency and 
stability; transparency and simplicity; democratic 
accountability and budgetary discipline; focus on 
European added value; subsidiarity; limited political 
transactions costs. The idea of assessing resources by 
means of such criteria is not new. However, the 
systematicity of this approach, without eventually 
prescribing one resource, could be considered as a 
major strength of the report. As all the proposed 
resources are evaluated in a similar way, the report 
provides a consistent analysis of various options, which 
decision-makers can use to select their preference.  
In this context, it has to be noted that different sets of 
criteria will influence what is considered as ‘best 
options’. Depending on the importance granted to one 
or the other criterion, what will be considered the ‘best 
option’ might change. Based on their political views, 
policy-makers could require potential new own 
resources to match different sets of criteria, without it 
meaning that – objectively – one option is better than 
the other. Although most of these principles (simplicity, 
transparency, equity and democratic accountability) are 
well-established, the array of options proposed to 
decision-makers will at least have the merit of urging 
the member states to face their responsibilities and 
allows for a new way of considering the EU budget.  
Moreover, it has to be underlined that some studied 
resources, such as the carbon tax, the emissions trading 
system or a transport tax, could have a broader – not 
solely budgetary – impact. Indeed, by favouring a 
decarbonisation or an energy transition, the budget 
becomes immediately linked to one of the major EU 
policies. This raises a fundamental concern, which is the 
potentially high degree of political resistance that such 
proposals could generate, further dividing the Union. 
Lastly, the Monti Report is not free from shortcomings. 
The absence of a discussion of clear mid- and long-term 
impacts of some of the proposed resources, as well as 
the risks of political trade-offs and the introduction of 
new complexities, weaken the report.  
Above all, however, the acceptance of the prescribed 
change of paradigm will to a large extent depend on the 
willingness of the member states. They will have to 
decide unanimously (Article 311.3 TFUE) if they want to 
provide the EU with genuine own resources. The 
diagnosis established by the Monti Report, crucial as it 
may be, only provides a basis for this discussion, 
touching upon a series of highly delicate and politically 
sensitive matters.  
Conclusion  
To conclude this overview and preliminary assessment 
of the Monti Report, one can certainly argue that the 
proposed analysis based on objective criteria entails 
many benefits. The introduction of genuine own EU 
resources would be a return to the spirit of the Treaty, 
and would be likely to mitigate the narrowly defined 
national interests, the juste retour issue and increase 
the pursuit of EU policy objectives.  
The budgetary problem is real, and as long as member 
states keep focusing on accounting calculations, the EU 
budget cannot be an efficient investment tool that 
enables the Union to deliver the full potential of its 
policies. The Monti Report, while not seeking to 
increase the overall volume of EU spending, has the 
merit of offering tentative solutions by finding new 
ways of financing the EU budget in order to make it less 
dependent on member states contributions.  
However, given that it is so closely intertwined with the 
core of state sovereignty, the debate about genuine 
own resources speaks to fundamental questions about 
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the future and finalité of the European integration 
process. In a context of budgetary restrictions, it seems 
therefore most unlikely that member states will agree 
on radically changing the EU’s own resources. Only a 
fundamental decision on the future of Europe could 
settle the issue of reforming the financing of the EU 
budget. Whether the necessary political will to deepen 
EU integration develops in the years to come is highly 
doubtful. In the absence of a radical overhaul of the 
existing system, addressing the issue of own resources 
in a structured way – based on the suggestions of the 
Monti Report – would therefore already have to be 
considered as representing progress in itself. 
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